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Abstract
The importance  of life insurance companies  as part of  of 63 countries averaged  over 1980-96, Beck and Webb
the financial sector has significantly increased  over the  find that educational attainment,  banking sector
past decades,  both as provider of important  financial  development,  and inflation are the most robust
services to consumers and as  a major investor in the  predictors of life insurance consumption, while income  is
capital market.  However,  Beck and Webb still observe a  only a weak predictor.  The results on educational
large variance  in life insurance consumption  across  attainment and inflation are confirmed  in a panel of 23
countries, which  raises the question of its determinants.  countries over the period 1960-96. The results
The authors  use a greatly expanded data set on life  strengthen the  case for promoting price stability,
insurance consumption  to examine  the determinants  of  financial sector reform, and an efficient education  system
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Life insurance  companies play an increasingly important role within the financial sector.
While during the period 1980-85, total assets of life insurance companies constituted only
11 % of GDP  for a sample of 13 countries, for which data are available, they constituted 28%
for the period 1995-97  in the same countries.'  This increased importance is also reflected in
the business volume of life insurers.  Whereas life insurance penetration - the ratio of
premium volume to GDP - was at 1.2% during the period  1961-65, it reached 3.2% in the
period 1991-96 for a sample of 19 countries,  for which data are available.2 While this
increased importance of life insurance both as provider of financial services and investment
funds on the capital markets is especially pronounced for developed countries, most
developing countries still experience very low levels of life insurance  consumption.  While
South Africa's penetration  ratio was 7.4% over the period 1980-96, Iran's was only 0.02%.
Given the large variation  in indicators of life insurance consumption across countries, the
question of the causes of this variation  and therefore the determinants of life insurance
consumption arises.
Life insurance provides individuals  and the economy as a whole with a number of
important financial services.  In the face of increasing urbanization, mobility of the
population, and formalization of economic relationships between individuals, families, and
communities,  life insurance  has taken increasing importance as a way for individuals and
families to manage income risk.  Also, life insurance products encourage  long-term savings
and the re-investment  of substantial sums in private and public sector projects.  Because life
'The  countries included  are: Australia,  Fiji, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,  Norway,  South Africa,
Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, U.K. and U.S. Source for these calculations are the data provided by Beck,
Demirguic-Kunt and Levine (2000).
2See sample in  Table 3.
2insurance products offer a means of disciplined contractual saving, they have become
effective as instrument for encouraging  substantial amounts of savings in many countries
around the world.  Leveraging their role as financial intermediaries,  life insurers have become
a key source of long-term finance.
In spite of the increasing importance that life insurance has in managing income risk,
facilitating savings, and providing term finance, we do not yet understand well what drives its
demand and supply across countries and over time.  A number of authors have proposed a
variety of different socio-economic  and institutional factors as possible determinants of life
insurance consumption.  Limited data samples, however, have constrained the testing of
theoretical hypotheses.
This paper improves  on the existing literature in several ways.  We use a greatly
expanded data set, combining results from panel and cross-sectional  analyses, and using
alternative measures of life insurance consumption.  First, the new data set extends
significantly the coverage of countries and time periods. Previous cross-sectional and panel
studies have been limited in depth or in breadth, and were not representative of the variety of
life insurance consumption across countries and over time.3 We use both 1) a cross-sectional
data set spanning 63 developed and developing  countries over the period 1980-96;  and, 2) a
panel data set spanning 23 countries over the period 1960-96.
Second, by combining cross-sectional and panel analysis we can compare cross-
country and time-series  variation in our relationships. The cross-country estimations test
several new hypotheses as well as previous findings on this expanded data set of developing
3Browne and Kim (1993)  use data for 45 countries for the year 1987, and Outreville (1996) for 48 countries  for
the year 1986.  Truett and Truett (1990) produce estimates for two countries, the U.S. and Mexico, over the
period 1960 to 1982 and Beenstock,  Dickinson, and Khajuria  (1986) for 10 Organization for Economic
Cooperation  and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1970-1981.
3and developed countries.  By using 16-year averages, moreover, the cross-section estimations
are not subject to selection year bias as are some other studies.4 The panel analysis allows us
to exploit the time series variation in life insurance consumption and its potential
determinants.  We can thus better assess what has driven the rapid increase in life insurance
consumption over the last four decades.
Finally, using three alternative  measures of life insurance  consumption provides
additional  depth.  Life insurance penetration,  life insurance density, and life insurance  in force
measure different aspects of life insurance consumption.  We identify a few specific
differences  we expect them to have with some of the determinants tested in this study.  Life
insurance in force is a stock variable,  indicating the outstanding face amounts plus dividend
additions of life insurance policies, while life insurance penetration  and density are flow
variables,  indicating the amount spent on life insurance premiums, relative to GDP or per
capita.
The results presented herein are expected to assist policy makers identify the
institutional and demographic  determinants that drive the supply and demand of life
insurance.  The findings may clarify new strategies  for developing  nascent life insurance
markets and extending the reach of life insurance's many benefits to a wider population.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our measures
of life insurance consumption.  Section 3 discusses  potential determinants  of life insurance
consumption.  Section 4 describes  the econometric techniques we will be using.  Section 5
presents the empirical results for the cross-section of 63 countries and section 6 for a panel of
23 countries and seven 5-year periods.  Section 7 concludes.
4  Empirical  tests of demand and supply hypotheses  within only one year are subject to distortion  from country-
specific fluctuations  in premium figures or economic indicators in that year.
42. Life Insurance across Countries
The majority of life insurance  policies around the world can be classified into three general
categories:  1)  policies providing death coverage only; 2) policies providing both a death
coverage and a savings component;  and, 3) policies serving primarily as saving vehicles.
What are known as term  policies  in the U.S. fall within the first category.  Premiums for these
policies essentially cover the cost of mortality risk, administrative expenses and a profit
loading.  Policies in the second category,  popularized as whole life, universal life, and
variable life in the U.S., generally have higher premiums that include an explicitly or
implicitly defined savings component.  This additional component  typically eams interest and
is retumed to the consumer through policy dividends, cash-values on termination of the
policy, or endowment sum on maturation of the policy.  Policies in the third category,  which
are not common in the U.S. but have been popularized  in other countries, are primarily
savings vehicles.  While they offer little or no mortality coverage, they are often considered
life insurance policies since they are marketed and sold by life insurers.
In addition to life policies, life insurers  sell annuity policies.  Annuities are insurance
policies wherein the insurer promises to pay the insured a series of periodic payments, often
over the remainder of his/her lifetime, upon payment of a lump sum at the beginning of the
period.  Insurers providing annuities  thus often undertake risks associated with
supperannuation  of the insured.
As the three measures of life insurance consumption  that we will be using in our
empirical analysis aggregate all three categories of life insurance policies as well as annuity
policies, we cannot distinguish between the demand and supply of mortality risk insurance
5versus savings through life insurance.  This aggregation in the data produces a bias against
finding significant relationships.5 Significant results between the variables hypothesized to
affect insurance consumption and the amount consumed are therefore likely to be a sign of  the
added robustness of these relationships.
Life Insurance Penetration is defined as the ratio of premium volume to GDP.  It
measures the importance of insurance activity relative to the size of the economy. Both
numerator and denominator are in local currency, with GDP numbers coming from the
Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF)'s Intemational Financial Statistics (IFS).  Life Insurance
Penetration, however, is not a perfect measure of consumption since it is the product of
quantity and price.  A higher premium volume might therefore reflect a higher quantity, a
higher price or a difference in the mix of mortality and savings element purchased.  Lack of
competition and costly regulation might increase the price of insurance without implying a
higher level of insurance consumption.
Our second indicator of life insurance consumption is Life Insurance Density,
defined as premiums per capita, expressed in intemational  real dollars.  It indicates how much
each inhabitant of the country spends on average on insurance in real intemational dollars. To
calculate these ratios, we first convert the premium volume into intemational dollars by
multiplying it with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion factors from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators (WDI).  We then divide the premium volume in intemational
dollars by the population size, also obtained  from the WDI and deflate the numbers by the
5  See Browne and Kim (1993),  footnote  1.
6 The Purchasing Power Parity conversion factor is defined as the number of units of  a country's currency
required to buy the same amounts of goods and services in the domestic market as one U.S. dollar would buy in
the United States.  Using PPP conversion factors is preferable to using exchange rates,  since the latter are
distorted by differences  in exchange rate regimes.  Furthermore, PPP conversion factors  take into account that the
price of nontraded  goods relative to traded goods increases  with the income level of economies. Since the death
6U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), obtained from the IFS, to make the indicator comparable
over time. Since data on the PPP conversion  factor are only available for the period 1980-96,
the insurance densities in international real dollars are constrained to this period. Insurance
densities using average-period exchange rates from the IFS are also calculated for the years
1960-1996 for use in the panel estimation.
Although both Life Insurance Penetration  and Life Insurance  Density use gross
premiums, there remain important differences between both measures with repercussions  for
cross-country  comparisons.  Life Insurance  Penetration  measures life insurance consumption
relative to the size of the economy, while Life Insurance  Density compares  life insurance
consumption  across countries without adjusting for the income level of the economy.
Consumers that purchase life insurance policies to insure their dependents against mortality
risk will potentially buy more coverage and thus a higher face value in richer countries, since
the death benefit has to replace a larger income.  We therefore expect Life Insurance  Density
to be more income elastic than Life Insurance  Penetration.
Our third measure of life insurance consumption is Life Insurance in Force to GDP.
It equals the sum of the face amounts plus dividend additions of life insurance policies
outstanding as a share of GDP.  It is a quantity measure of life insurance consumption, the
quantity being mortality risk underwritten plus savings accumulated.  Life insurance  in force
thus contains both the cash value of policies, associated with the savings component of life
insurance policies and the net amount of risk faced by life insurers.  Data on life insurance in
force were obtained from the American Council of Life Insurance and GDP data from the
benefit of life insurance  policies has to cover the typical household expenditures  in both traded and nontraded
goods, using exchange rates  would bias the insurance  density of developing countries  downward.
7IFS.7 Unlike Life Insurance  Penetration  and Life Insurance  Density, Life Insurance in Force
to GDP  does not include the price and so measures only quantity.
Although all three measures of life insurance consumption contain all three types of
life insurance products described above, the mortality risk and the savings  components have
different weights in the premium and in the stock measures.  For a given structure of the
insurance market, the mortality risk component,  as measured by the net amount of risk, has a
stronger weight in Life Insurance in Force to GDP  than in Life Insurance  Penetration  or
Density.
Table 1 presents summary statistics  and correlations for our three measures  of life
insurance consumption.  We observe a large variation in levels of life insurance consumption
across countries. Whereas  Iran had a Life Insurance  Penetration  of 0.02 % of GDP during
1980-96,  South Africa's penetration  ratio was 7.4 %.  Iranians  spent one dollar per year on
life insurer services,  whereas Japanese spent 1,129 dollars.  Similarly, Peru's Life Insurance
in Force constituted  1.4% of GDP, whereas Japan's superseded  320 % of GDP. There are
large correlations between all three measures  of life insurance consumption that are
significant at the one-percent level.  We also present the elasticity of the three indicators of
life insurance consumption to real per capita income.8 The positive elasticity seems to
indicate that life insurance is a superior good; consumers spend a higher share of their income
on life insurance products as per capita income increases.  As expected, the elasticity of  Life
7 Since the numerator is a stock and the denominator a flow variable, both  variables have to be deflated
accordingly. We follow a procedure proposed by Beck, Demirgac-Kunt,  and Levine (2000) and deflate the stock
variable by end-of-year consumer price indices (CPI) and the GDP by the annual CPI. Then we compute the
average of the deflated  stock variable in year t and t-l  and divide  it by real GDP measured  in year t.  For the CPI
numbers we use line 64 and for GDP line 99b from the IFS.  The end-of-year CPI is either the value for
December or, where not available, the value for the last quarter.
8  We calculate these elasticities  by looking at the correlation between the log of the three insurance indicators
and the log of real per capita income.  To make the correlations comparable across the three indicators, they are
calculated over the 36 countries for which we have data on all three measures.
8Insurance Density to real per capita income is higher than for Life Insurance  Penetration,
while the elasticities for Life Insurance  Penetration  and Life Insurance  in Force to GDP  are
not significantly different from each other.  Note, however, that these are simple correlations
and do not control for other determinants  of life insurance consumption.
3. Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption
This section describes the theoretical underpinnings of our empirical tests and different
factors hypothesized to drive the demand and supply of life insurance policies. Table 2
summarizes the potential determinants  of life insurance demand and supply and their
hypothesized sign.9
3.1. Theoretical Underpinnings
Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969) were the first to develop a theoretical framework to
explain the demand for life insurance.  Within this framework,  the demand for life insurance
is attributed to a person's desire to bequeath  funds to dependents  and provide income for
retirement.  The consumer maximizes lifetime utility subject to a vector of interest rates and
a vector of  prices including insurance premium rates.  This framework posits the demand for
life insurance to be a function of wealth,  expected income over an individual's lifetime, the
level of interest rates, the cost of life insurance policies (administrative costs), and the
assumed subjective discount rate for current over future consumption.
Lewis (1989) extends this framework by explicitly incorporating the preferences of the
dependents and beneficiaries into the model.  Specifically, he derives the demand for life
insurance as a maximization problem of the beneficiaries, the spouse and the offspring of the
9life insurance policyholder.  Deriving utility maximization by both spouse and offspring
separately and assuming no bequest by the policyholder  and an isoelastic utility function,
Lewis shows that total life insurance demand can be written as follows:
(1- lp)F = max{[  I  P  TC - W,O}  (1)
where I is the policy loading factor - the ratio of the costs of the insurance to its actuarial
value -, p the probability of the primary wage earner's death, F the face value of all life
insurance written on the primary wage earner's life, Sa measure of the beneficiaries'  relative
risk aversion, TC the present value of consumption of each offspring until he/she leaves the
household and of the spouse over his/her predicted remaining life span ands  W the
household's  net wealth.  Life insurance demand increases with the probability of the primary
wage earner's death, the present value of the beneficiaries'  consumption and the degree of
risk aversion.  Life insurance demand decreases with the loading factor and the household's
wealth.
Life insurance consumption, however,  is not only driven by consumer demand.  There
are important supply-side factors which affect the availability and price of life insurance.
Insurance companies need both the human and information resources to effectively measure
the pricing and reserving requirements  for products  as well as adequate  opportunities in
financial markets to invest adequately.  An adequate protection of property rights and an
effective enforcement of contracts also facilitate the investment function of life insurers.
These supply factors  are expected to affect the costs of life insurance products.  Within the
9 For an excellent  overview of the potential determinants of the demand and supply of life insurance  products,
see Skipper (2000), chapter 3.
10Lewis model, described above, these supply-side factors might be represented by the policy-
loading factor.
While there have been attempts to model the relation between the supply and demand
of life insurance separately, data limitations have restricted the empirical testing of these
hypotheses.'0 While we can observe the total amount spent on life insurance policies, using
premium data, or the total face value of outstanding insurance policies,  we cannot distinguish
between  supply and demand.  Furthermore, premium data do not allow us to observe the
actual amount of insurance coverage purchased, as they are a combined measure of price and
level of coverage.  Unless the price is constant across countries, which is unlikely, assuming
that the premium is equivalent to the amount of coverage would introduce a source of noise in
our estimations.  On the other hand, using the variable often used to proxy price (premiums
over life insurance in force) in a cross-country or panel data set requires one to make a
troublesome assumption, namely, that the mix of policies remains constant across countries
and time. 11
Price, however, is undoubtedly an important determinant in the consumption of life
insurance, and leaving it out may subject the empirical testing to omitted variable bias.  We
address this problem in two ways.  First, we assume that the price is a function of several
supply-side factors that are likely to affect the ability of insurers to market and distribute
policies cost-effectively.  Varying levels of urbanization, monetary stability, bureaucratic
quality, rule of law, corruption, and banking sector development  all impact the insurer's
ability to provide cost-effective insurance.  Including these supply-side factors within our
'° Compare Beenstock,  Dickinson,  and Khajuria (1986).
1  l Browne and Kim (1993)  use such a price variable, but note the bias introduced by different composition of the
overall insurance portfolio across countries.empirical model thus reduces the bias introduced by the missing price variable.  Second,  we
use panel estimation techniques that eliminate biases due to omitted variables,  such as the
price variable in our model.
In the following we will describe different variables that may be linked to the demand
function described by Lewis (1989) as well as several supply factors that might proxy for the
policy loading factor.  While the Lewis model, described above, focuses on the mortality risk
component of life insurance policies, we will link the different determinants also to the
savings component of life insurance policies.
3.2. Demographic Variables
A higher ratio ofyoung dependents to working population is assumed to increase the demand
for mortality coverage and decrease the demand for savings through life insurance.  On the
one hand, a larger share of dependents increases the total present value of consumption of the
insured's beneficiaries, and therefore the demand for life insurance that provides  dependents
with payments  in the event of the premature death of the primary wage earner.1 2 On the other
hand, a high dependency ratio indicates the extent to which the population  is too young to
consider saving for retirement,  and therefore reduced demand for savings through life
insurance products. Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria,  (1986), Browne and Kim (1993) and
Truett and Truett (1986)  find that the dependency ratio is positively correlated with life
insurance penetration.  Given opposite effects of the dependency ratio on the mortality and
savings components of life insurance, however,  we predict that a higher dependency ratio is
ambiguously correlated with life insurance consumption.  To measure the ratio of young
12 This would result in a higher TC in Eq. (1).
12dependents  to the working population, we use data from the WDI. The indicator is defined as
the ratio of the population under 15 to the population between  15 and 65. 13
A higher ratio of  old dependents to working population  is assumed to increase the
demand for both the mortality and the savings component of life insurance policies. While the
theoretical  work focuses mostly on the life insurance policies held by primary wage earners,
life insurance policies held by retirees have gained  importance in many developed countries.
Furthermore, we conjecture that in countries with a larger share of retired population, savings
through life insurance policies as well as protection against superannuation gains  importance.
To measure the ratio of old dependents to the working population, we use data from the WDI.
The indicator is defined as the ratio of the population over 65 to the population between  15
and 65.
We expect that a higher level of education  in a population will be positively correlated
with the demand  for any type of life insurance product. The level of a person's education may
determine his/her ability to understand the benefits of risk management and savings.  A higher
level of education might therefore increase an individual's level of risk aversion.14 Education
may also increase the demand for pure death protection by lengthening the period of
dependency,  as well as increasing the human capital of, and so the value to be protected  in,
the primary wage earner. 5  Truett and Truett (1990) and Browne and Kim (1993) find a
positive relationship between life insurance consumption and the level of education.  As an
indicator of the level of education across countries we use the average years of schooling in
the population over 25, obtained from Barro and Lee (1996).
13 We also use an alternative  dependency measure, the overall  dependency ratio, which is the sum of  young and
old dependency ratios.
14 This would be reflected by a lower  8in Eq. (1).
'5 This would be reflected by a higher TC in Eq. (1).
13The religious inclination of a population may affect its risk aversion and its attitude
towards the institutional  arrangements of insurance.'6 Religious opposition against life
insurance, while stronger in European  countries before the  19th century, still persists in several
Islamic countries today.' 7 Followers of Islam are known to disapprove of life insurance
because it is considered a hedge against the will of Allah.  Unsurprisingly, Browne and Kim
(1993), and Meng (1994),  find a dummy variable for Islamic countries to be negatively
correlated with life insurance demand.  This study employs a broader measure of religious
inclination by including Protestantism,  Catholicism and a composite of other religions.  The
religion variables  are defined as the ratio of adherents of one religion over the entire
population.  While we expect the Muslim share of the population to be negatively related to
life insurance demand, we do not have prior expectations  about the signs on the other religion
variables.  We use data from La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer and Vishny (1999).
Economies  with a higher share  of urban to total  population  are expected to have
higher levels of life insurance consumption.  The concentration of consumers in a geographic
area simplifies the distribution of life insurance products, as costs related to marketing,
premium collection, underwriting  and claim handling are reduced.  Lower costs, in turn,
should encourage a greater supply.'8 The variable used is from the WDI, measuring the share
of urban population in the total population.
Societies with longer life expectancies should have lower mortality coverage costs,
lower perceived need for mortality coverage, but higher savings through life insurance
16 This would be reflected by cross-country variation in  8 in Eq. (1).
17  Zelizer (1979) discusses the role that religions have in creating  a cultural opposition to life insurance.
18  While we describe the close relationship  certain  variables are likely to have with the price of life insurance,
and so its supply, we recognize that there may be demand-side relationship with these variables as well.  For
example, a higher share of urban population is often correlated with less reliance on informal insurance
agreements and therefore may  induce a higher demand for formal insurance products.
14vehicles.'9 This would imply an ambiguous correlation with the demand for life insurance
products.20 Previous authors [Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria (1986), and Outreville (1996)]
have found life expectancy  positively related to Life Insurance  Penetration. We use data on
life expectancy from the WDI.
3.3. Economic  Variables
Life insurance consumption  should rise with the level of income, for several reasons.  First, an
individual's consumption and human capital typically increase along with income.  This can
create a greater demand for insurance (mortality coverage) to safeguard the income potential
of the insured and the expected  consumption of his/her dependents.2'  Second, life insurance
may be a superior good, inasmuch as increasing  income may explain an increasing ability to
direct a higher share of income towards retirement and investment-related  life insurance
products.  Finally,  the overhead costs associated with administrating and marketing insurance
make larger size policies less expensive per dollar of insurance  in force, which lowers the
price of life insurance  policies.  Campbell (1980), Lewis (1989), Beenstock,  Dickinson,
Khajuria (1986), Truett and Truett (1990), Browne and Kim (1993), and Outreville (1996)
have all shown that the demand for life insurance  is positively related to income, using both
aggregate national account data and individual household data.  To measure the income level
of countries, we employ real GDP per capita, using data from the WDI.22
We expect inflation to have a negative relationship with life insurance consumption.
As life insurance  savings products typically provide monetary benefits over the long term,
monetary uncertainty has a substantial negative impact on these products'  expected returns.
'9 A higher life expectancy  would be reflected by a lowerp  in Eq. (1).
20 Compare Beenstock,  Dickinson, Khajuria, (1986).
21 This would be reflected by a higher TC in Eq. (1).
15Inflation  can also have a disruptive effect on the life insurance industry when interest rate
cycles spur disintermediation.  Fixed interest rates and loan options imbedded  in some life
insurance policies,  for example,  spurred disintermediation  in the U.S. life insurance market
during the inflationary  1970's and  1980's.  These dynamics make inflation  an additional
encumbrance  to the product pricing decisions of life insurers, thus possibly reducing supply in
times of high inflation.23 We measure inflation  as the log difference of the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), using data from the IME's International Financial Statistics.
We expect banking  sector development to be positively correlated with life insurance
consumption.  Well-functioning  banks may increase the confidence consumers have in other
financial institutions, e.g. life insurers.  They also provide life insurers with an efficient
payment system.  The efficient development of the entire financial system - as might be
reflected in the absence of interest rate ceilings and other distortionary policies - is thought to
help life insurers invest more efficiently.  This in turn may translate into a better value, or
price, offered to consumers for their life insurance.  Outreville (1996) finds a significantly
positive relationship between financial development and life insurance penetration.  We use a
measure of banking sector development  provided by Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt and Levine
(2000).  Specifically, we measure the total claims of deposit money banks on domestic
nonfinancial  sectors as share of GDP.
We expect the size of a country's social  security system to be negatively correlated
with the demand for life insurance products.  Kim (1988) and Meng (1994) postulate that
social security displaces private insurance.  If a greater amount of retirement savings is being
channeled through the government, or if  the public  sector provides substantial benefits to
22 Previous cross-country  studies have used both Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), and GNP minus depreciation  and indirect business taxes [Browne and Kim (1993).]
16families of prematurely deceased wage earners, then ceteris paribus there should be less
demand for life insurance savings products.  This public-private  sector substitution  may apply
similarly to benefits provided to families of prematurely  deceased wage earners.24 This study
uses the share of public expenditures on social security and welfare  as a share of GDP as an
indicator of the size of the social security system, with data coming from the WDI.
The expected correlation  of the income distribution  of a country with life insurance
consumption is ambiguous.  Beenstock, Dickinson, Khajuria (1986) reason that wealthy
sections of the population do not need insurance protection while poorer sections have a
limited demand because they operate under income budget constraints.25 A more equal
income distribution resulting in a larger middle class might therefore result in a higher
demand for life insurance policies.  On the other hand, one can argue that the very rich can
(and do in the U.S. and other countries) use life insurance to pass on wealth to their
descendants.  Furthermore, while the middle-class  may have the greatest demand for life
insurance savings products and may also be able to afford the minimum administrative  costs
associated with any type of life insurance policy, there may be a minimum level of income at
which these policies become affordable.  Accordingly,  a large middle class in a poor country
may result in less individuals being able to purchase life insurance than a less equal
distribution with a larger and/or wealthier upper class.  The resulting relationship of income
distribution with life insurance consumption is therefore  ambiguous.  Beenstock, Dickinson,
Khajuria (1986)  find that the less equal is the distribution of income, the lower the penetration
23 Cargill and Troxel (1979) discuss the various impacts that  inflation  can have on the market for life insurance.
24 This would be reflected in a higher  Win Eq. (1).
25  The possibility  of declining risk aversion with greater wealth, and the replacement of life insurance coverage
with surplus assets in an individual's portfolio is expected to  reduce the demand for life insurance among the
wealthy.
17of life insurance.  We use the Gini coefficient to measure income distribution. Our data come
from Deininger and Squire (1996).
3.4. Institutional  Determinants
The tenability of a vibrant life insurance market depends to a large extent on the institutional
framework of a country.  An inclination to fraud may induce individuals to file duplicitous
claims or claims arising from intentionally  induced death of insured.  If fraud is common in
claim reporting,  then the insurance mechanism will become prohibitively costly for a large
part of the population, or simply break down entirely.  Moreover,  highly inefficient
government  bureaucracies  tend to go hand in hand with inefficient judiciaries.  The inability
to appeal the breach of life insurance contracts by insurers reduces the value of an insurance
contract to consumers  and may deter them from committing large sums of money into these
products.  Finally, the lack of property protection and contract enforcement  impedes life
insurers' ability to invest efficiently and control the price of their products.
To measure these institutional factors, we use three different indicators compiled by
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  Rule of  Law measures the degree to which
citizens of a country are able to use the legal systems to mediate disputes and enforce
contracts.  Bureaucratic  Quality measures the autonomy from political pressures, the strength
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions  in government
services, and the existence of an established mechanism for recruiting  and training.
Corruption,  finally, measures the degree of corruption in an economy.  These indicators are
constructed so that higher values represent better institutional environments.
183.5. Regional and Time Dummies
In addition to the explanatory variables described up to now, we include regional dummy
variables and, in the panel regressions,  time dummy variables.  We include regional dummy
variables to capture any other potential determinants that are not proxied for by other
explanatory variables.  Among these might be cultural or historic differences  that are not
captured by the religious composition or any of the other variables.  We include dummy
variables  for Latin America, Africa and Asia, with European and North American  countries
captured  in the constant. We include time dummy variables in the panel estimations to test
whether there is a secular increase in life insurance consumption across countries that cannot
be explained  by any of the other explanatory variables.
4. Econometric Methodology
We use both cross-sectional and panel estimation techniques to explore the empirical  relation
between life insurance consumption  and the potential determinants identified by theory and
described in the previous section.  This section describes the rationale behind the cross-
country regressions and then the panel techniques  that we are using.
The cross-sectional  analysis uses data for 60 countries in the case of  Life Insurance
Penetration  and Density and 39 countries  in the case of Life Insurance in Force  to GDP. 26
We include the dependent and several independent variables  in logs, so that the coefficients
on the explanatory variables can be interpreted as elasticities.  Data are averaged over the
27 period  1980-96, so that there is one observation per country.  By averaging data over several
26 Table 3 lists the countries in the sample.
27  The two samples for life insurance penetration/density and life insurance  in force only partly overlap.  The life
insurance  in force sample contains 36 of the same countries within the life insurance penetration/density  sample
and three more new countries: Fiji, Honduras and Zambia
19years we eliminate selection year bias that arises when life insurance consumption and its
determinants are measured only in one year.
The panel analysis uses data for  19 mostly developed  countries, with data averaged
over seven 5-year periods between  1960 and  1996.28  Using a panel allows us to not only
exploit the cross-country variation but also the variation over time in life insurance
consumption and its potential determinants.  Since most of our countries in the panel sample
are high-income countries in Europe and North America, however,  we lose cross-country
variation, while gaining additional time series variation.
We use the random-effects  and the fixed-effects model to estimate the panel
regressions.  This allows us to control for differences  across countries that are otherwise not
accounted for.29 While the fixed-effects model introduces country-specific  intercepts, the
random effects  model introduces a country-specific error term.  We will use a Hausman test to
test for the appropriateness of the fixed- or the random-effects  model.30 We will use the
fixed-effects  results, whenever the Hausman test shows a p-value of less than 10%.
5. Determinants of Life Insurance across Countries, 1980 - 1996
This section presents the results of cross-country regressions for our three life insurance
consumption indicators on different determinants over the period  1980-96.  The baseline
28 The samples for Life Insurance  Penetration and Density,  on the one hand, and Life Insurance  in Force, on the
other hand, are not identical.  Specifically, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain, and Mexico are only in the sample of
Life Insurance Penetration and Density,  while Netherlands,  Peru, Philippines,  and Taiwan are only in the sample
of Life Insurance in Force.
29 The latter can be variables that are not included in our estimation since  they are not varying over time or other
underlying country characteristics  that are not captured in any of our variables.  Among these omitted variables
might be the price variable, for which we use proxy variables such as the supply determinants described above,
but do not have any direct measure.
30 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that random- and fixed effects estimates are not statistically
different under the assumption that both estimators are consistent.  In this case,  however, the fixed effects model
20regression contains real per capita GDP, the young dependency ratio, the average years of
schooling,  the life expectancy,  the inflation rate and the indicator of banking sector
development.  These variables can be linked directly to Lewis'  model of life insurance
demand, with the latter two conjectured to impact the policy-loading  factor.  In subsequent
regressions we include a larger set of potential determinants  of life insurance consumption.
Given that we have different samples for our three measures, we also test the robustness of the
results by using the joint sample of 36 countries.31 While not presenting the results, we will
discuss differences between the larger samples and the joint sample.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the results for the cross-sectional regressions  for Life
Insurance Penetration,  Life Insurance  Density, and  Life Insurance in Force to GDP,
respectively.  P-values, calculated from heteroskedasticity  robust t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.  The R2 of our regressions  indicate that the included variables  explain more than
half of the variation of life insurance consumption across countries.  The first column reports
the results of our baseline regression; columns  2-10 report the results when including
additional determinants.
5.1. Life Insurance  Penetration
The results in Table 4 show that the variation of Life Insurance Penetration  across countries
can be explained by variation in income level, average years of schooling, life expectancy,
inflation and banking sector development.  These five variables show significant coefficients
in our baseline regression.  Whereas the results for average years of schooling, inflation and
banking sector development are robust to including other potential explanatory variables, the
results for income level and life expectancy  are less robust.
is inefficient. Under the altemative hypothesis that both estimates are statistically different only the fixed-effects
model gives consistent coefficients.
21The results of our baseline regression in column 1 indicate that a 10% increase in real
per capita income increases Life Insurance  Penetration  by 3.5%, thus confirming that life
insurance is a superior good.32 When we include the Gini coefficient,  regional dummies or
bureaucratic  efficiency, however, the coefficient on income level turns insignificant.  This
might indicate that the correlation between income level and Life Insurance Penetration  is a
spurious one proxying for other determinants of life insurance consumption.  Furthermore,
once we restrict the sample to the 36 countries for which we have data for all three measures
of life insurance consumnption, the coefficient on income level turns insignificant.
The results underline the importance of a high level of education for life insurance
consumption.  The coefficient  on average years of schooling is significant in all regressions.
The result is also economically  large.  If Algeria's population had had 5.94 years of education
in 1980, as did the median country, instead of the actual  1.48, its Life Insurance  Penetration
would have been 0.66% of GDP, instead of the actual 0.08%.  This result is robust to the use
of the smaller sample of 36 countries.
Macroeconomic  stability, especially price stability, seems to be an important predictor
of life insurance consumption.  The coefficient on the inflation rate is significantly negative  in
all specifications.  The effect of a stable macroeconomic environment is also economically
large.  If Brazil - the country with the highest average inflation rate in our sample - had
achieved an average inflation rate over the period 1980-96 of the sample median 8.92%
3  See footnote 25.
32 The fact that the elasticity found in the regression analysis is lower than the simple correlation reported  in
Table I can be explained by the fact that here we control for other determinants of life insurance  consumption.
22instead of the actual  159%, Life Insurance Penetration  would have been 1.  16% of GDP
instead of 0.20%. . This result is robust to the use of the smaller sample of 36 countries.
Banking sector development is positively correlated  with Life Insurance  Penetration,
while a higher life expectancy  seems to reduce Life Insurance  Penetration. The coefficient  on
the indicator of banking sector development is significantly positive  in all specifications. 34
However,  this result is not completely robust to the use of the smaller 36-country sample.
The result on life expectancy, on the other hand,  is not robust, once we include regional
dummy variables or bureaucratic  efficiency.  This confirms the theory that predicts an
ambiguous  sign on life expectancy.
Variation  in the share of young population cannot explain variation in Life Insurance
Penetration  across countries.  This result confirms the hypothesis of two offsetting effects of
the dependency ratio on gross premiums, a positive effect on mortality risk and a negative
effect on the saving component.35
Turning to our additional explanatory variables, the religious composition and income
distribution can explain variation in Life Insurance Penetration  across countries.  The results
in column 3  indicate that - as hypothesized - a higher share of Muslim population decreases
Life Insurance  Penetration  significantly.  The results in column  5 indicate that societies with
less equal income distribution have a higher level of Life Insurance  Penetration. This result
can be interpreted  as additional evidence that life insurance is a superior good and that there
33 This result matches the findings by Babbel (1981) that even the demand for inflation-indexed  life insurance
policies decreases during inflationary periods in Brazil.
4 The positive coefficient does not imply a causal impact of banking sector development on life insurance
penetration.  It shows that countries with well-developed banks  also have higher levels of life insurance
consumption.
35  This result is robust to the use of the overall dependency  ratio.
23may be an income budget constraint.  This is contrary to the findings by Beenstock,
Dickinson and Khajuria (1986).36
The results in columns 2, 4 and 6 indicate that neither the old dependency ratio, nor
the share of urban population, nor the social expenditures  by government  can explain cross-
country variation in Life Insurance Penetration,  as hypothesized  above.  The coefficient on
neither variable is significant  in the respective regression.
The results in columns 7 through 9 indicate that out of our three indicators of
institutional quality only the quality of bureaucracy  is positively correlated with Life
Insurance  Penetration,  although only at the  10% level.  The coefficients  on both the rule of
law and corruption are insignificant.  While this can be interpreted as lack of evidence that
these supply side deterninants are important,  it can also be concluded that our indicator of
banking sector development captures some of these supply side factors.
The results in column  10, finally, indicate that there are still additional factors
determining Life Insurance  Penetration  not captured by any of the variables in the baseline
regression.  The three regional dummies that we include are jointly significant  at the  1% level.
5.2. Life Insurance  Density
The results in Table  5 indicate that the income level, average years of schooling, inflation  and
banking sector development explain the variation  in Life Insurance  Density across countries.
The young dependency  ratio and life expectancy  cannot explain variance in Life Insurance
Density. These results are very similar to the ones obtained for Life Insurance  Penetration,  so
that in the following we will concentrate  on the differences.
36 We also considered interaction  terms between several of the explanatory variables, so for example between the
urbanization ratio and income distribution.  However, we did not find any significant effect.
24Life Insurance  Density increases with real per capita GDP.  A 10% higher income
level increases Life Insurance  Density by 8.2%.  This result is larger than for Life Insurance
Penetration  and also more robust to including other variables in the regression.  Even when
we restrict the sample to 36 countries, we find that the income level enters most times at least
at the  10% significance  level.  This finding is consistent with the differences between the two
indicators of life insurance consumption,  as explained in section 2.  The income elasticity of
0.82 is significantly higher than in otlier studies.37
As in the case of Life Insurance  Penetration,  the religious composition,  the income
distribution and the quality of bureaucracy can explain variation in Life Insurance  Density
across countries.  Countries with less Muslim population,  less equal income distribution and
more effective bureaucracies  spend more on life insurance  than other countries.  The old
dependency ratio, the share of urban population, the share of social expenditures  by
government  in GDP, the rule of law or corruption cannot explain variation of Life Insurance
Density across countries.  The regional dummies can explain part of the variation, but unlike
the case of Life Insurance  Penetration  do not decrease the significance  level of the other
variables in the baseline regression.
5.3. Life Insurance  in Force  to GDP
The results in Table 6 indicate that the share of young population,  average years of schooling
and the inflation rate can explain variation in Life Insurance in Force to GDP across countries.
These three variables show significant coefficients  in the baseline regression and the results
are mostly robust to including additional variables.
37 Browne and Kim (1993)  find an income elasticity  of 0.58, Beenstock,  Dickinson and Khajuria  (1986) 0.57 and
Outreville (1991)  0.52.
25Countries with a higher share of young population have higher Life Insurance in Force
to GDP. A  10% increase  in the share of the population under  15 relative to the working
population results in a 24.6% higher Life Insurance  in Force  to GDP. 38 This result is
generally robust to including other variables, except when we include the Gini coefficient.
The latter result, however,  is due to the smaller sample.39 Why do we find a positive
correlation of the young dependency  ratio with Life Insurance in Force to GDP, while not
with Life Insurance  Penetration  and Density?  While a higher share of dependents increases
the mortality component of all life insurance measures, the corresponding decrease  in the
savings component might offset this in the case of the premium-based measures.  But since
mortality risk insurance constitutes a larger share of Life Insurance in Force to GDP than in
Life Insurance  Penetration  and Density, the positive effect on the mortality risk component
might dominate in the case of Life Insurance in Force to GDP.
As in the case of Life Insurance  Penetration  and Density, price instability has a
negative impact on Life Insurance in Force to GDP, while higher levels of education result in
higher Life Insurance  in Force to GDP.  Both variables show significant  coefficients in all
regressions.
There does not seem to be an independent effect of the income level or life expectancy
on Life Insurance  in Force to GDP.  Banking sector development  shows a significant
coefficient on Life Insurance in Force to GDP  only in the baseline regression,  when
controlling for corruption or the old dependency ratio or when including the regional
dummies.
38 This result is  confiwmed when we use the overall dependency ratio, although only at the I  0%-significance
level.
39 we confirm this by running the baseline regression on the sample for which we have data on income
distribution.  The young dependency  ratio enters  insignificantly.
26Turning to the additional explanatory variables, societies with larger shares of urban
population and more efficient bureaucracies  have higher levels of  Life Insurance  in Force to
GDP. Both variables show significantly positive coefficients.  The religious composition of
the population cannot explain variation in Life Insurance in Force to GDP  across countries.
The Gini-coefficient,  the share of social expenditures by government  in GDP, the rule of law
or the level of corruption do not seem to be determinants of Life Insurance in Force  to GDP.
The results of column  10, finally, show that there is still some variation in Life
Insurance in Force to GDP, which cannot be explained by any of our variables in the baseline
regressions  and which is picked up by the regional dummies.  Including these dummies,
however, does not change the results of our baseline regression.
6. Determinants of Life Insurance in a Panel of Countries
This section complements  the previous cross-sectional  estimations by considering the
determinants of life insurance consumption  in a panel of 23 countries for Life Insurance
Penetration  and Density and Life Insurance in Force  to GDP over a period of 36 years.
While the sample for the period  1980-96 comprises a broad cross-section of developed and
developing countries, the sample for the period 1960-96 comprises mostly Organization of
Economic  Cooperation and Development  (OECD) countries.  This limits the comparability of
the results across the two samples.  Using this longer sample, however, allows us to test how
changes in the determinants  over time within the countries affect life insurance consumption.
27We report the results of either fixed- or the random-effects  estimations, depending on the
Hausman test, as described in section 4.40  Tables 7,  8 and 9 report the results.4'
The results in Table 7 indicate that the income level and average years of schooling
are robust predictors of Life Insurance  Penetration  variation across countries and over time,
while there is a negative  and weakly significant link between inflation and life insurance
consumption.  The coefficient on the log of real per capita GDP is significant at the 1% level
in all regressions,  except when we control for the old dependency ratio. Average years of
schooling have a significantly positive coefficient  in all regressions.  Inflation enters
significantly negative at the  10% level in all regressions, except when controlling for the old
dependency  ratio. The young dependency ratio, life expectancy and banking sector
development,  on the other hand, are not robust predictors of life insurance penetration in our
sample of  high-  and middle-income  countries.  Turning to the other explanatory variables, we
note that the old dependency ratio enters significantly positive, implying that countries with a
higher share of population in retirement age experience higher levels of Life Insurance
Penetration. This result contradicts  our findings in the broader cross-country sample for the
period  1980-96.  Furthermore, we find that the religious composition of the population
predicts life insurance penetration, while none of the other explanatory variables enters
significantly.  The time dummies, however,  enter jointly significant  in all regressions,
indicating that not all of the increase in life insurance consumption over the period 1960-96
40 We use a p-value of 10% as cut-offpoint.  However, for regressions with time-invariant variables  we report
the random-effects  results, independent of the Hausman test.
41 Unlike in  the panel regressions for the period  1980-96, we treat the three indicators of institutional quality,
Rule of Law, Bureaucratic  Quality and Corruption, as time-invariant, since the data start in 1982.  We do not
include the share of public  expenditures on social  security and welfare as  share of GDP in  these regressions,
since data start only in 1970.
28can be explained by the determinants included in our empirical analysis.  The Hausman tests
indicate the appropriateness of the random effects model for all regressions.
The results in Table  8 indicate that variation in Life Insurance  Density across countries
and time can be explained by differences in the income level, the average years of schooling
and inflation.  The income level and the inflation rate enter significantly in all regressions,
while the average years of schooling enters significantly in all regressions  except for column
(5) where we control for the income distribution and use the fixed-effects model. As in the
cross-country estimations, we find that the coefficient  on the income level is higher for Life
Insurance  Density than for Penetration. We also note that the coefficients on the income
level are higher in the panel  estimations for the period  1960-96 than for the cross-country
estimations for the period  1980-96, both in the case of Life Insurance  Penetration  as Density.
This might indicate that life insurance consumption  is even more income elastic over time
within a country than indicated by simple cross-country regressions.  As it is the case for Life
Insurance  Penetration,  the old dependency ratio enters significantly positive, while none of
the other explanatory variables enters significantly at the 5% level.  Again, the time dummies
enter jointly significant in all regressions.
The results in Table 9 show that the income level, the average years of schooling and
the young dependency ratio are weakly correlated with Life Insurance in Force  to GDP, while
the inflation rate and banking sector development  are robust indicators of Life Insurance in
Force  to GDP. Whereas the significance of the income level depends  on the set of the
explanatory variables, the average years of schooling and the young dependency ratio enter
significantly positive only in the random-effects  regressions.  Inflation and banking sector
development enter significantly at the 5% level in all regressions, except for banking sector
29development in the regression with the Gini coefficient. None of the other explanatory
variables enters significantly  at the 5%  level.  Unlike in the regressions of Life Insurance
Penetration  and Density, the time dummies do not enter significantly.
Why do the panel regressions yield different results than the cross-country regression?
First, the sample for the panel regressions is much more homogenous than the cross-country
sample, comprising mostly OECD countries that had similar macro-economic  performances
and demographic  structures over the last 40 years.  Second, the relation between life insurance
consumption and its potential determinants might be different across countries as opposed to
over time within a country.  Overall, we confirm  that educational attainment, as measured by
the average years of schooling, and macroeconomic  stability, as measured by the inflation
rate, continue to be robust predictors of life insurance consumption,  across all three indicators
of life insurance consumption.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzed the determinants of life insurance consumption in a cross-country sample
of 63 countries over the period 1980-96 and in a panel of 23 countries over the period 1960-
96.  We used three different indicators of life insurance, Life Insurance  Penetration,  Life
Insurance  Density, and Life Insurance  in Force  to GDP.
Our cross-country regression results indicate that Life Insurance  Penetration  and
Density increase with the income level, whereas there is no independent  effect of real per
capita income on Life Insurance  in Force  to GDP.  Education  is strongly correlated with all
three indicators of life insurance consumption.  Countries with higher inflation rates
experience  lower life insurance consumption, a result that is again consistent across the three
30indicators.  Countries with a higher share of young population have higher Life Insurance in
Force  to GDP, but not higher Life Insurance  Penetration  or Density.  Countries with higher
levels of banking sector development and higher levels of bureaucratic  quality experience
higher levels of life insurance  consumption.
The results from the panel regressions  1960-96 underline the importance of education
and inflation in explaining  life insurance  consumption across countries and over time.  We
find a weak correlation between income level and life insurance  consumption in the panel.
While  we do not find a relationship between banking sector development and Life Insurance
Penetration  and Density, we find a robust correlation of banking sector development with Life
Insurance  in Force to GDP in the panel. Unlike in the cross-section,  we find that countries
with a larger share of old population experience higher levels of Life Insurance  Penetration
and Density.  We find evidence for a secular increase in Life Insurance  Penetration  and
Density that cannot be explained by other determinants,  but not for Life Insurance  in Force to
GDP.
In summary, the level of education and price stability are the most robust predictors of
life insurance  consumption across countries and over time.  While the bi-variate correlation
analysis suggests a high income elasticity of life insurance consumption,  the regression results
indicate only a weak predicting power of income.  Finally, banking sector development seems
to be a weak predictor of life insurance consumption.  While we often find positive and
significant coefficients, these results are not robust across the different measures of life
insurance consumption and across cross-section  and panel analysis.
The results of this paper constitute not only a useful test of hypotheses of the demand
and supply of life insurance  consumption, but have also implications  for policy makers that
31want to promote the life insurance sector and life insurers  assessing the potential of a new
market.  A stable monetary environment  enhances  the supply and demand of life insurance
policies.  Higher levels of education promote the demand for life insurance policies.  Finally,
although our results do not establish a causal impact of banking sector development on life
insurance  consumption, the positive correlation we often find underlines the importance of a
sound financial system.  All three policy areas have positive effects on economic development
and growth independent of their positive effect on the development  of the insurance  sector.
Further, price stability has a positive impact on bank and stock market development.42 Our
results strengthen the case for promoting price stability, financial sector reform and an
efficient education system if life insurance and its many benefits  are to be fully realized in an
economy.
42 See Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001).
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35Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Descriptive Statistics 1980 - 96
Life Insurance Penetration  Life Insurance Density  Life Insurance  in Force to GDP
Mean  1.57  202.61  65.91
Median  0.81  52.56  54.10
Standard Deviation  1.79  266.95  67.88
Maximum  7.40  1128.72  320.06
Minimum  0.02  1.07  1.37
Observations  60  60  39
Correlations
Life Insurance Penetration  Life Insurance Density  Life Insurance  in Force to GDP
Ufe Insurance Penetration  1
Life Insurance Density  0.89  1
(0.001)
Life Insurance in Force  0.78  0.81  1
(0.001)  (0.00 1)
Income Elasticity  0.571  0.818  0.550
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
p-values are reported in parentheses
Life Insurance Penetration =  ratio of premium volume to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Life Insurance Density =  premiums  per capita, expressed in intemational real dollars
Life Insurance in Force to GDP =  ratio of the sum of the face amounts plus dividend additions to GDP
36Table 2: Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption Across Countries:
Expected Results
Savings  Mortality Risk  Combined
Component  Component  Effect
Demographic  Young Dependency  Ratio  +  ambiguous
Education  +  +  +
Urbanization ratio  +  +  +
Religion  -muslim  -muslim  -muslim
Life expectancy  +  ambiguous
Economic  Income  +  +  +
Inflation
Banking sector development  +  +  +
Social Security
Gini coefficient  ambiguous  ambiguous  ambiguous
Institutional  Rule of Law  +  +  +
Bureaucratic Efficiency  +  +  +
Corruption  +  +  +
This table assumes the division of life insurance consumption into a savings and a mortality
risk component. The first column describes the expected effects on the savings component,
the second column on the mortality risk component. The third column presents the
combined predicted effect in our regression analysis.
37Table 3: Countries in the Sample
Cross-section estmations  Panel estimations
Life Insurance  Life  Insurance  Life Insurance  Life Insurance
Penetration / Density  in Force  to GDP  Penetration / Density  in Force to GDP
Algeria
Argentina
Australia  *  *















Finland  . .
France  . .
Germany  *  .
Great  Britain  . .
Greece  *









Israel  *  *
Italy  *  *




Mexico  *  *
Netherland  *  *
New Zealand  *
Norway  *  *
Pakistan
Panama






South Africa  *
Spain  *  *
Sweden  *  *
Switzerland
Taiwan  *  *








38Tabte  4: Th2e t6ter,ninents of Life Insurance Penetration In a Cross-Section  s98  0-96
(1)  (2)  (3)  44)  (S)  (0)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Constant  -2.718  0.o  -2.788  -2,811  -3.t81  4.8805  4.037  -5.118  -3,503  -1.872
(0.490)  (0906)  (0504)  (0469)  (0a50)  (0.2g98  (0471)  (0.202)  (0300)  (e.696)
Incornr,eleva  0.348  0.390  0.5T8  0.482  0.222  0.3Q1  0.408  0.144  0.325  0.135
(0r029)  (o.013)  (OWlV)  (0.018)  (0160)  (e0.8s)  (0.008)  (0.369)  (0030)  (0.446)
Young Dependency Rata'  0.204  -0.383  0.14  0.333  -1.178  0.323  0.163  0,52  0370  -0.374
(0.66)  (0.596)  (0.303)  (0.423)  (0.193)  (0.583)  (0.749)  ?O.272)  (o421)  (0.533)
Average  yeamrs  ofechoing  190  2,075  2.180  1,380  2.121  2.132  2.308  1.928  1.727  1.836  1.725
(0.00f)  (o.001)  (0002)  (.001)  (0.001)  (00MI)  (o.001)  (0.002)  (0D001)  (0001)
Life  expectancy  -0.107  -0.108  -0.121  -0.097  -0.117  -0.090  -0.097  -10.069  0.099  4072
(0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.004)  (J  02)  (0.020)  (0.119)  (.020)  (0P15)
tnOaicn?  -2.025  -1.935  -2.260  -1.596  -2201  -1.526  -2.175  -1.689  .2026  -1.518
(O005)  (0,004)  (W00I)  (0.022)  (0.002)  (0048)  (0006)  (0004)  (0.002)  (0.010)
Banking  sector  develaramen(  0.786  0.78.  0.757  0.763  0.772  0.017  0.775  0.732  0.745  0.854
(000)  (0.00V)  (0.0S)  (0.001)  (o.002)  (0.a3)  (.oo0)  (0.001)  0.002)  (0o003)
Old  Dependency  Rallo'  -0.651
(0.165)





lJrbaa(zaliaa  rati  -0.84  25
(0.147)
Gimn  roenioent'  2.060
p0.005)
Social  secunty  40.216
(0174)
Rule  of Law  -0.110
(0.439)









F-test  reliolO  50.13
(0.004)
F-tost  re,.n.  7.85
(0.001)
Nu.bn, of cbsarVaOons  20  60  60  60  54  49  89  59  59  60
R_  _  _  0.662  0683  0.775  0.882  0.755  0.666  0.884  0701  0.682  0.773
1 vadfable  Induaed  vn  logs
2  rariable  included  as  Iag(l  vasiable)
p-kvalus are  reprlted <a  parenalleses
39Table  5: The Determinants  of Life Insurance Density In a Cross-Section  1980 -96
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Constant  -6.516  -2.408  -6.630  -6.587  -7.178  -8.125  -6.636  -8.819  -7.142  -5.541
(0.101)  (0.626)  (0.113)  (0.094)  (0.134)  (0.092)  (0.123)  (0.033)  (0Q068)  (0.243)
Income level'  . 0.819  0.871  1.069  0.922  0.676  0.846  0.879  0.605  0.789  0.604
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0-001)
Young Dependency Ratio'  0.535  -0.191  0.874  0.671  -0.995  0.649  0.475  0.841  0.679  -0.085
(0.262)  (0.781)  (0.089)  (0.166)  (0.257)  (0.285)  (0.409)  (0.095)  (0.151)  (0.883)
Average years of schooling  19862  2.089  2.219  1.347  2.125  2.170  2.409  1.970  1.763  1.871  1.738
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Life expectancy  -0.073  -0.074  -0.087  -0.065  -0.084  -0.063  -0.064  40.034  -0.065  -0.038
(0.113)  (0.103)  (0.079)  (0.142)  (0.036)  (0.236)  (0.145)  (0.442)  (0.139)  (0.469)
tnflabon
2
-2.135  -2.023  -2.391  -1.885  -2.253  -1.677  -2.292  -1.794  -2.131  -1.666
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.034)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)
Banking sector devetopment'  0.855  0.861  0.815  0.840  0.863  0.853  0.849  0.805  0.816  0.940
(0001)  (0.001)  (0Q003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)








Urbanization  rato'  -0.477
(0.288)
Gini coefficient'  2.307
(0-001)
Social security'  -0.226
(0.169)
Rule of Law  -0.125
(0.399)










F-test religion  6.55
(0.001)
F-test regions  9.15
(0.001)
Number of observations  60  60  60  60  54  49  59  59  59  60
R
2
0.841  0.649  0.893  0.844  0.887  0.821  0.845  0.853  0.843  0.888
1 vanable induded in logs
2 vanable inciuded as log(l-variable)
p-values are reported in parentheses
40Table 6: The Determinants of Life Insurance in Force in a Cross-Section  1980 -96
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Constant  -16.078  -16.466  -14.991  -16.097  -18.854  -20.419  -15.337  -17.027  -15.999  -14.028
(0.003)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.032)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004)
Income leve
1P  0.049  0.032  0.301  -0.232  0.040  0.122  0.060  -0.338  -0.072  -0.177
(0.873)  (0.923)  (0.381)  (0.489)  (0.914)  (0.740)  (0.853)  (0.190)  (0.801)  (0.441)
Young Dependency  Ratio  2.460  2.540  2.536  2.094  2.368  3.193  2.176  2.681  2.523  1.785
(0.002)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.103)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.008)
Averageyearsofschlooling1980  2.170  2.187  1.935  1.898  2.217  2.511  2.366  1.877  2.179  2.403
(0Q001)  (0.001)  (0Q009)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0Q001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0Q001)
Ufe expectancy  0.057  0.057  0.036  0.052  0.061  0.064  0.073  0.096  0.062  0.053
(0.188)  (0.198)  (0.459)  (0.192)  (0.130)  (0Q178)  (0.084)  (0.016)  (0.173)  (0.240)
Inflabon
2
-4.681  4.721  -5.352  -5.554  4.380  -5.287  -5.307  -3.956  -4.817  -5.190
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0Q001)  (0Q001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Banklng sector development'  0.573  0.566  0.338  0.507  0.711  0.555  0.512  0.435  0.555  1.030
(0.043)  (0.048)  (0.502)  (0.072)  (0.114)  (0.137)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.049)  (0.003)








Urbanization  rato  1.256
(0.026)
Gini coefficient  0.645
(0.559)
Social security  0.000
(0.999)
Rule of Law  40.233
(0.330)










F-test religion  1.26
(0.306)
F-test regions  6.68
(0.001)
Number of observations  39  39  39  39  35  32  38  38  38  39
R2  1  0.685  0.686  0.729  0.728  0.712  0.673  0.700  0.731  0.694  0.761
1 variable inciuded  in  logs
2 variable  induded as log(l+variable)
p-values are reported In parentheses
41Table 7: The Determinants of Life Insurance Penetration In a Panel 1960-96
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Constant  -6.184  -5.703  .4.867  -8.833  -6.065  -6.185  -5.457  -6.187  -7.876
(0.007)  (0.012)  (0.029)  (0.003)  (0.064)  (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.011)  (0.014)
Income level'  0.702  0.057  0.682  0.695  0.593  0.712  0.527  0.698  0.770
(0.005)  (0.849)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.037)  (0.011)  (0.079)  (0.020)  (0.005)
Young Dependency Ratio'  0.249  0.306  0.336  0.260  0.499  0.251  0.346  0.245  0.174
(0.468)  (0.350)  (0.321)  (0.450)  (0.279)  (0.481)  (0.328)  (0.482)  (0.623)
Average years of schooling
2
1.413  1.608  1.227  1.283  1.684  1.447  1.300  1.394  1.498
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0Q001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Life  expectancy  -0.045  -0.022  -0.040  -0.052  -0.045  -0.045  -0.042  -0.045  40.038
(0.137)  (0.470)  (0.175)  (0.091)  (0.215)  (0.137)  (0.175)  (0.141)  (0.231)
Inflator?  -0.673  -0.608  40.692  -0.796  -1.332  -0.685  -0.718  -0.670  -0.766
(0Q085)  (0.105)  (0.061)  (0.048)  (0.021)  (0Q078)  (0.064)  (0Q090)  (0.060)
Banking  sector development'  0.214  0.296  0.172  0.255  0.243  0.206  0.224  0.218  0.229
(0Q100)  (0.018)  (0.182)  (0Q054)  (0.181)  (0.114)  (0.087)  (0Q099)  (0.089)








Urbanization  ratio'  0.780
(0.162)
Gin! crDcient'  0.127
(0.765)
Rule  of Law  -0.024
(0.886)








F-test religion  8.92
(0.030)
F-test regkins  2.00
(0.368)
F-Test time dummies  20.25  21.48  22.92  20.07  8.00  19.24  21.24  19.81  17.36
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.238)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.008)
Hausmantest  1.92  14.33  7.02  2.74  5.69  2.34  4.89  1.93  2.29
(1.000)  (0.351)  (0.857)  (0.999)  (0.957)  (0.999)  (0.962)  (1.000)  (0.999)
Numberofobservations  123  123  123  123  80  123  123  123  123
Countries  19  19  19  19  15  19  19  19  19
R
2
0.713  0.637  0.799  0.700  0.732  0.714  0.741  0.712  0.742
1 variable induded  in logs
2 variabte incduded as log(1+variable)
p.values are raported in parentheses
All regressions are random-effeca s
42Table 8: The Deterrninants of Ufe  Insurance Density in a Panel 196046
(1r-  (2r  (3r'  (4)--  (5r  (6r  (7)--  (Br,  (9)--
Constant  -12.012  -11.870  -10.368  -15.504  -20.643  -12.426  -11.350  -12.283  -15.920
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0e001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Inconme  level'  1.847  1.200  1.777  1.847  2.399  1.957  1.728  1.908  2.049
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (o.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Young Dependency Ratb'  0.379  0.394  0.487  0.383  0.385  0.313  0.474  0.357  0.209
(0.303)  (0.260)  (0.186)  (0.294)  (0.403)  (0.410)  (0.212)  (0.337)  (0.579)
Average years  of scdooling'  1.620  1.788  1.486  1.448  0.244  1.693  1.628  1.657  1.737
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.747)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Life  expectancy  -0.034  -0.009  -0.029  -0.043  0.051  -0.035  -0.032  -0.035  -0.021
(0.292)  (0.785)  (0.367)  (0.187)  (0.256)  (0.289)  (0.335)  (0.290)  (0.539)
Inflatkn
2
-0.930  -0.860  -0.969  -1.087  -2.579  -0.945  .0.981  40.918  -1.118
(0.026)  (0.032)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.010)
Banking sector  development'  -0.138  -0.042  -0.177  -0.083  0.028  -0.147  0.143  40.141  4.082
(0.325)  (0.755)  (0.205)  (0.555)  (0.879)  (0.289)  (0.309)  (0.316)  (0.566)








Urbanization rato  1.006
(0.090)
Ginl coefficient'  -0.337
(0.455)
Rule of Law  -0.159
(0.393)








F-test  religion  5.930
(0.115)
F-tast regions  2.90
(0.234)
F-Test time dummies  40.22  37.87  46.90  38.03  2.08  33.58  38.70  35.85  27.17
(0.001)  (0Q001)  (0.001)  (0Q001)  (0.030)  (0Q001)  (0.001)  (0Q001)  (0Q001)
Hausmantast  9.30  19.27  53.10  8.75  25.34  9.55  44.29  9.56  7.18
(0.677)  (0.115)  (0.001)  (0.792)  (0.021)  (0.656)  (0.001)  (0.654)  (0.846)
Numberof observations  123  123  123  123  80  123  123  123  123
Countries  19  19  19  19  15  19  19  19  19
R'  0.865  0.836  0.899  0.860  0.788  0.882  0.875  0.862  0.887
1 variable  included in  logs
2 variable included as log(lvariable)
p-values are  reported in  parentheses
Fixed effects astmaions.  - random effects estimatons
43Table 9: The Determinants of Life Insurance In Force In a Panel 1960-96
(1)-  (2)'  (3)--  (4Y  (Sr,  (6)--  (7)"  (8)"  (9)--
Constant  -9.899  -10.552  -4.676  4.113  -5.853  -5.664  -3.013  -4.778  -6.650
(0.062)  (0050)  (0.027)  (0.274)  (0.237)  (0.040)  (0.321)  (0.078)  (0.013)
Income  level'  1.200  1.453  0.520  1.242  0.553  0.575  0.233  0.452  0.844
(0.010)  (0.011)  (0.040)  (0.007)  (0.118)  (0.057)  (0.514)  (0.209)  (0.003)
Young Dependency Ratio'  0.723  0.769  1.218  0.789  1.247  1.200  1.367  1.202  1.307
(0.159)  (0.138)  (0.022)  (0e120)  (0.067)  (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.008)
Averageyearsofschsooing
2
0.376  0.266  1.459  0.404  1.666  1.348  1.218  1.274  1.314
(0.578)  (0.701)  (0.006)  (0.544)  (0.035)  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.007)
Life expectancy  -0.005  -0.006  0.007  0.023  0.016  0.000  -0.006  -0.003  -0.009
(0.911)  (0.895)  (0.834)  (0.628)  (0.761)  (0.993)  (0.864)  (0.935)  (0.816)
tntbtalon
2
-1.392  -1.314  -2.396  -1.401  -2.969  -2.051  -2.095  -2.055  -1.848
(0.015)  (0.024)  (0001)  (.0013)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Banking  sector development  0.637  0.626  0.488  0.609  0.460  0.618  0.659  0.648  0.437
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.136)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.033)








Urbanizaton ratido  -1.452
(0.073)
Gins  coemldent'  -0.191
(0. 784)
Rule  of Law  0.007
(0.973)








F-test religion  5.33
(0.149)
F-test reglons  5.39
(0.066)
F-Test time dunmmies  021  0.28  3.61  0.22  1.62  2.65  5.18  3.64  3.18
(0.972)  (0.944)  (0.730)  (0.969)  (0.951)  (0.852)  (0.521)  (0.726)  (0.786)
Hausmantest  53.32  118.91  12.77  20.78  16.62  10.18  14.33  11.85  30.05
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.386)  (0.077)  (0.217)  (0.600)  (0.280)  (0.458)  (0.003)
Numnberotobservations  106  106  106  106  69  106  106  tO6  106
Countries  19  19  19  19  15  19  19  19  19
R_  0.417  0.433  0.688  0.358  0.639  0.614  0.657  0.622  0.669
1 variable included In  logs
2 variable included as log(1-variable)
p-vaiues are  reported In  parentiheses
Fixed effects esUtmafons,  * random  effects estimaUons
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